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Abstract Under anxiety, people sometimes perform
poorly. This concerns cognitive performance (e.g., taking an
important exam) as well as perceptual-motor performance
(e.g., picking up a cup from a table). There is still much
debate about how anxiety affects perceptual-motor perfor-
mance. In the current paper we review the experimental lit-
erature on anxiety and perceptual-motor performance,
thereby focusing on how anxiety affects the perception,
selection, and realization of action possibilities. Based on
this review we discuss the merits of two opposing theoretical
explanations and build on existing frameworks of anxiety
and cognitive performance to develop an integrated model
that explains the various ways in which anxiety may spe-
cifically affect perceptual-motor performance. This model
distinguishes between positive and negative effects of anx-
iety and, moving beyond previous approaches, recognizes
three operational levels (i.e., attentional, interpretational,
and behavioral) at which anxiety may affect different aspects
of goal-directed action. Finally, predictions are formulated
and directions for future research suggested.
Introduction
Emotions, and anxiety in particular, figure prominently in
our everyday lives. Think, for instance, about the tension
you may experience when asking your boss for a pay raise,
the hesitation when finally approaching that boy or girl that
you like, or the nervousness before taking an important
exam. Sometimes, emotions can be so strong that they seem
to alter the way in which we perceive and act upon the world
around us (cf., Oudejans & Nieuwenhuys, 2009; Proffitt,
2006). As such, the study of emotion, and especially the
impact that emotions may have on various aspects of our
behavior, has received much attention in the literature.
While there are many different kinds of emotions, the
present paper focuses on state anxiety, which, according to
Schwenkmezger and Steffgen (1989), ‘‘can be regarded as
a broad concept for a number of very complex emotional
and motivational states and processes that occur as a result
of threat. This threat is related to the subjective evaluation
of a situation, and concerns jeopardy to one’s self-esteem
during performance or social situations, physical danger, or
insecurity and uncertainty.’’ (pp. 78–79).
In past decades, much has been written about the effects
of anxiety on cognitive functioning (e.g., taking an impor-
tant exam; Eysenck, 1992; Mathews, 1990; Sarason, 1988;
Wine, 1971), thereby revealing several mechanisms that
explain how anxiety influences cognitive performance (see
Beilock, 2008a; Bishop, 2007; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos,
& Calvo, 2007, for recent overviews and theoretical
advancements). Similarly, on a behavioral level, many
studies have looked at the relationship between anxiety and
perceptual-motor performance (e.g., taking a decisive pen-
alty during a world-championship final; see Hardy, 1996;
Spence & Spence, 1966; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). How-
ever, despite recent theoretical advancements (e.g., Beilock
& Gray, 2007; Wilson, 2008) empirical findings are still
scattered, and an overarching framework to explain the
mechanisms underlying this relationship does not yet exist.
Cognitive accounts of anxiety and performance show
that under anxiety, increases in activation of the amygdala
A. Nieuwenhuys (&)  R. R. D. Oudejans
Research Institute MOVE, Faculty of Human Movement
Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, Van der Boechorstraat 9,
1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: a.nieuwenhuys@vu.nl





(an important emotional center in the brain) are coupled to
decreases in the recruitment of prefrontal control mecha-
nisms (e.g., Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004a, b; Kim,
Somerville, Johnstone, Polis, & Alexander, 2004; Somer-
ville, Kim, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2004). As a
result, anxious individuals show increased attention for
threat (i.e., attentional bias), and are more likely to inter-
pret emotionally ambiguous stimuli in a threat-related
manner (i.e., interpretational bias; see Bar-Haim, Lamy,
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & IJzendoorn, 2007;
Bishop, 2007, for an overview of this literature). Generally,
this means that when people are anxious, it becomes harder
for them to concentrate on a task and efficiently process
task-relevant information, which often leads to a decrease
in cognitive performance (e.g., Eysenck & Calvo, 1992;
Eysenck et al., 2007).
In the perceptual-motor literature, similar mechanisms
have been proposed to account for the effects of anxiety on
perceptual-motor performance, the general consensus
being that through its effect on attention, anxiety affects the
degree to which we (are able to) control our movements
(Beilock & Gray, 2007). With respect to how this process
takes place, however, opinions are divided. On one hand,
so-called distraction models (e.g., attentional control theory,
Eysenck et al., 2007; see Wilson, 2008) argue that if attention
is drawn towards task-irrelevant (threat-related) stimuli
under anxiety, this should mean that less attention is avail-
able for movement execution. After all, perceptual-motor
tasks require an appropriate adjustment of movements on the
basis of available perceptual information (e.g., about the
location of a target). This implies that as a result of anxiety,
people’s movements may become less accurate, and they
may need more attempts or more time to successfully per-
form a certain task (e.g., Behan & Wilson, 2008; Causer,
Holmes, Smith, & Williams, 2011; Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers,
Oudejans, & Bakker, 2008; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011;
Vickers & Williams, 2007; Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009).
At the same time, it is well known that expert per-
formers have practiced movements so often that their
execution is highly automatized. In this regard, execution
focus models (e.g., explicit monitoring, Beilock & Carr,
2001; reinvestment, Masters, 1992) argue that limited
attentional resources cannot explain the negative effects of
anxiety upon performance. Rather, anxiety may cause
attention to be drawn inwards, and lead to attempts to
explicitly control or monitor ones movements. For expert
performers this disrupts the automatic execution of the task
at hand and seriously harms performance (e.g., Beilock &
Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004; Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008;
Lam, Maxwell, & Masters, 2009; Masters, 1992).
Given these contrasting views, in the current paper we
will aim to shed more light on the relation between anxiety
and perceptual-motor performance. To this end we will
provide a structured review of the available literature and
discuss the scope and opposing predictions of both dis-
traction and execution focus models. Based on this review
and discussion we will then propose an integrated model
that describes the various concepts, mechanisms, and pro-
cesses that are involved. This model is strongly based on
distraction principles (i.e., attentional control theory;
Eysenck et al., 2007) but extends previous approaches by
recognizing separate operational levels (i.e., attentional,
interpretational, and behavioral) at which anxiety may affect
different aspects of goal-directed action. Finally, predictions
are formulated and directions for future research are
suggested.
Perceptual-motor performance
In our review of the literature we will bring together a broad
range of experimental studies, which have been conducted
on the basis of a variety of (theoretical) approaches to
anxiety and perceptual-motor behavior. Our own approach
to perceptual-motor behavior can be considered embodied
(e.g., Beilock, 2008b; Proffitt, 2006; Wilson, 2002), and
ultimately has its origins in ecological psychology (Gibson,
1979). Essentially, the embodied approach holds that
information is a product of our interaction with the world
and, hence, inherently specifies the behavioral possibilities
of an environment taken with reference to a particular actor
(e.g., Proffitt, 2006). Based on these claims, the embodied
approach differs from more traditional information-pro-
cessing approaches (e.g., Fodor, 1983) with respect to the
nature of information that we detect (i.e., abstract vs. rela-
tional) and the amount of internal processing that is needed
to perceive and act upon the environment (i.e., direct vs.
indirect perception; e.g., Wilson, 2002).
Although within the embodied approach visual stimuli
are believed to be inherently meaningful, this does not mean
that people do not require attention to detect this kind of
information and use it to guide their actions. For example,
one has to attend to the proper information in order to
successfully calibrate and adjust movements in relation to a
target (e.g., in catching a fly-ball; Jacobs, Runeson, &
Michaels, 2001; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Davids,
1999; Withagen & Michaels, 2005). Additionally, in many
situations (e.g., in sports) there are multiple possibilities for
action, and several stimuli that compete for attention. As
such, relevant information concerning a preferred action
should be singled-out (selected) and used to perform the
action(s), while irrelevant information is ignored.
By describing information in terms of the behavioral
possibilities of an environment, perceptual-motor behavior
can be conceptualized as a process of perceiving, selecting,
and realizing possibilities for action (Pijpers, Oudejans,
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Bakker, & Beek, 2006; see Williams, Davids, & Williams,
1999, for a more traditionally structured equivalent). In the
current paper we will use this conceptualization to structure
our review of the literature on anxiety and perceptual-motor
performance, starting with the detection of task-relevant
information (perception), continuing with the selection of
action possibilities (selection), and ending with the actual
execution of movement itself (action). The intention of this
review is not to be complete or exhaustive in any way, but to
provide a relatively clear and comprehensive overview of
the various ways in which anxiety may affect goal-directed
action, thereby providing an adequate background for the
more theoretical discussion that follows.
Anxiety and perceptual-motor performance
Perception of task-relevant information
Although the majority of experimental studies that have
been conducted, focused on how anxiety may affect the
actual execution of movements, several studies have shown
that even before one engages in action, anxiety affects how
we visually scan our environments. Typically it is shown
that when people are anxious, their scanning behavior
becomes less efficient. That is, they are more easily dis-
tracted by task-irrelevant information and, in general,
execute more fixations of shorter duration (see Janelle,
2002, for an overview). In addition, several studies have
shown that under anxiety, threatening stimuli tend to attract
extra attention (e.g., Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski,
2003) and are particularly difficult to disengage from (e.g.,
Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). For instance, in a
recent experiment, Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans (2011)
showed that when police officers executed a shooting
exercise against a threatening opponent that shot back with
colored-soap cartridges (high-anxiety), they executed more
and longer fixations to the head and gun of the opponent
(i.e., threat-related sources of information) than when the
opponent did not shoot back (low-anxiety). With more
attention for threat-related information, the officers spent
less time fixating the targets they were supposed to hit. As
such, one way in which anxiety may affect the perception
of action possibilities is by causing people to attend to
different information (e.g., threat-related vs. task-relevant).
In addition, recent work on embodied perception sug-
gests that even when we do attend to the same information,
anxiety may lead to changes in visual perception (Proffitt,
2006). For example, individuals who are afraid of heights,
tend to see heights as higher than people who are not afraid
of heights (Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, &
Proffitt, 2008). Similarly, perceived reaching ability
decreases as individuals are high above the ground and
experience more anxiety (Pijpers et al., 2006). According to
Proffitt (2006), changes in our psychological or physiological
state influence the costs we associate with performing an
intended action, and thus, strongly affect our perception of
task-specific variables. Recently, Proffitt and colleagues
provided evidence that this effect already occurs at the initial
level of perception, that is, before any post-perceptual pro-
cessing takes place (e.g., Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2010).
In a similar vein (but from an information-processing
perspective), several studies have suggested that anxiety
influences how we interpret information (see Bishop, 2007;
Blanchette & Richards, 2010, for an overview of this lit-
erature). That is, when people have to judge the meaning of
a particular situation or stimulus (e.g., threatening or not
threatening), anxiety makes the selection of a threat-related
interpretation more likely, potentially because it strength-
ens the output of our threat-evaluation mechanism and
inhibits the influence of pre-frontal control mechanisms
(Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). For
instance, when individuals listen to a voice recording and
are asked whether they heard the word ‘die’ or ‘dye’,
anxious individuals more often report that they heard the
word ‘die’ (e.g., Calvo & Castillo, 2001). Likewise, when
police officers are asked to judge whether a suspect has a
gun or not, a combination of stereotype threat and time
pressure causes them to report guns more often (e.g.,
Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Payne, 2001). As
such, besides causing people to attend to different infor-
mation (e.g., threat-related vs. task-relevant), anxiety may
also affect the perception of action possibilities by altering
how we perceive and interpret our environment.
Selection of action possibilities
Knowing that anxiety may alter the perception of action
possibilities, it can be argued that these changes also promote
changes in the selection of action possibilities (Oudejans &
Nieuwenhuys, 2009). That is, when people pick up different
information or perceive the environment differently based on
their current state, it is possible that action possibilities are
not always recognized, or that people become biased towards
specific (threat-related) alternatives. For example, in a study
of Pijpers et al. (2006), decreases in perceived reaching
ability under anxiety influenced the number of holds that
participants used when they had to climb from one end of
a climbing wall to the other. That is, participants used
more holds, and made arm and leg movements over shorter
distances, when they were anxious (high on the wall) com-
pared with when they were not anxious (low on the wall; cf.
Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, et al., 2008).
In a more recent experiment, Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh,
and Oudejans (2011) measured police officers’ gaze behavior
during the execution of a shooting task (i.e., shoot or don’t
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shoot) and specifically tested whether effects of anxiety on
decision-making may be attributed either to changes in gaze
behavior (i.e., which information is picked up) or to how the
environment is perceived or interpreted when people are
anxious. Using a video-simulation environment,
Nieuwenhuys et al. asked police officers to shoot or not
shoot at rapidly appearing suspects that either had a gun and
‘shot’, or had no gun and ‘surrendered’, while anxiety was
manipulated by turning on (high-anxiety) or turning off
(low-anxiety) a ‘shootback canon’ that could fire small
plastic bullets at the officers. When the officers were anx-
ious (under the threat of being hit) they showed a response
bias towards shooting, implying that they accidentally shot
more often at suspects that surrendered. Underlying this
effect, Nieuwenhuys et al. found no differences in gaze
behavior between correct and incorrect shooting responses.
That is, the officers scanned the environment at an equal
pace, fixated the same locations, and detected the suspect
equally fast in both situations. Nevertheless, incorrect
shooting responses were accompanied by response times
that were almost 20% shorter than correct shooting
responses. These results suggested that under anxiety,
the officers were more inclined to quickly respond on the
basis of threat-related inferences and expectations rather
than using task-relevant visual information that showed
whether the suspect had a gun or not (cf. Correll et al., 2002;
Payne, 2001). As such, by affecting how people perceive or
interpret their environment (Bishop, 2007; Mathews &
Mackintosh, 1998; Proffitt, 2006), anxiety may seriously
alter the selection of action possibilities (e.g., shoot or don’t
shoot).
Movement execution
Finally, when it comes to movement execution, people
need perceptual information to establish the coordination
patterns and muscle activity that make their actions
possible.
Perceptual information to guide movements
In goal-directed action (e.g., far aiming), the amount of time
that one continuously looks at a target appears to be strongly
correlated with performance (see Vickers, 2007, for an
overview). That is, to be successful, people need enough
information about a target to accurately calibrate and adjust
their movements in relation to that target. For example, in
basketball jump-shooting, players need to focus on the rim
and, as they jump, execute their shot on the basis of their
(changing) position in relation to the rim (e.g., Oudejans,
Van de Langeberg, & Hutter, 2002). In line with distraction
models (e.g., attentional control theory; Eysenck et al.,
2007), several studies showed that the time that people
fixate on such a target is significantly reduced under anxi-
ety, which allows less time to fine-tune movements on the
basis of visual information, and causes a considerable
decrease in performance (e.g., Behan & Wilson, 2008;
Causer et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010, 2011;
Vickers & Williams, 2007; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009).
Additionally, with less time spent fixating targets,
anxious individuals tend to spend more time looking at
other (threat-related) sources of information (e.g., Nie-
uwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011). Because vision is often
used to inform action (e.g., Land, 2009), the mere fact
that one looks at task-irrelevant (threat-related) sources of
information under anxiety, may already be enough for
movements to deviate in that direction. Indeed, Wilson,
Wood, and Vine (2009) showed that when participants
performed a soccer penalty kick under conditions of high-
anxiety, they tended to increase the number and duration
of fixations to the goalkeeper (a potential source of
threat), and actually ended op shooting closer to the
goalkeeper’s position (see also Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker,
& Savelsbergh, 2010).
Besides aiming tasks, reductions in on-task attention
have been shown to also affect movement efficiency in
endurance tasks. For instance, in a recent experiment
Nibbeling, Daanen, Gerritsma, Hofland, and Oudejans
(2011) had participants run on a treadmill at different
heights above the ground. In line with distraction models
(e.g., attentional control theory; Eysenck et al., 2007),
when participants ran high above the ground (high-anxiety),
they reported that their thoughts were strongly captured by
their fear of falling—suggesting that less task-relevant
attention was available for efficient running. Indeed, par-
ticipants appeared to make shorter steps, showed higher step
frequencies, and showed longer contact times when they
were anxious compared with when they were not anxious.
As a result of these changes, heart rate and oxygen
uptake increased, indicating that (in several ways) running
efficiency was lower under anxiety (cf. Brown, Doan,
McKenzie, & Cooper, 2006).
Finally, in line with execution focus models (e.g.,
explicit monitoring, Beilock and Carr, 2001; reinvestment,
Masters, 1992), there are also studies that show how paying
too much attention to a task can be counterproductive.
When expert performers are asked to explicitly focus on
their movement execution, this seems to disrupt the
otherwise automatic execution of a task, leading to less
efficient (more rigid) movement behavior, and reduced
performance (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Carr,
MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Gray, 2004; Gucciardi &
Dimmock 2008; Lam et al., 2009; Masters 1992). For
example, Beilock et al., (2002) showed that when expert
soccer players had to perform a dribble task and explicitly
attended to the side of their foot with which they touched
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the ball, their performance (execution time) was signifi-
cantly worse than when they attended to task-irrelevant
tones. Although there is no direct evidence yet, execution
focus models claim that this is also what happens under
anxiety (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992).
Action readiness and behavioral responses
Although anxiety often affects action by altering how
movements are calibrated and adjusted based on perceptual
information, it can also affect movement execution
directly. That is, under anxiety, the excitability of the
corticospinal motor tract is increased (potentially to enable
quick responses in relation to threat), which leads to higher
levels of muscle activation and more force production
when performers are anxious (e.g., Coombes, Higgins,
Gamble, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2009; Schutter, Hofman, &
Van Honk, 2008). Obviously, such changes in action
readiness have an impact on how movements are per-
formed. For instance, Pijpers, Oudejans, Holsheimer, and
Bakker (2003) showed that when participants climbed high
on a climbing wall (and thus experienced more anxiety),
they showed higher levels of muscle activation, more co-
activation, stronger fatigue, and higher blood lactate con-
centrations. These changes in muscle activity promoted
changes in movement execution, in the sense that move-
ments became slower, less fluent, and were more rigid
under anxiety, leading to consequent decreases in perfor-
mance (see also Beuter & Duda, 1985; Yoshie, Kudo,
Murakoshi, & Ohtsuki, 2009).
In addition, emotional (e.g., threatening) stimuli give
rise to motivational orientations that facilitate specific
behavioral responses (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Zajonc, 1980).
When responding to the onset of emotional cues (e.g.,
words, pictures), positive stimuli tend to facilitate approach
movements (e.g., moving toward the stimulus), whereas
negative stimuli tend to facilitate avoidance movements
(e.g., moving away from the stimulus; Krieglmeyer,
Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; Krieglmeyer,
De Houwer, & Deutsch, 2011; Lavender & Hommel,
2007; Stins, Roelofs, Villan, Kooijman, Hagenaars, &
Beek, 2011). Also, several studies have shown that people
are more likely to make response errors when performing
on emotion-incongruent trials (e.g., moving toward a
positive stimulus when the instruction is to move away
from this type of stimulus; Krieglmeyer et al., 2011; Stins
et al., 2011). Although preliminary, these findings point to
an overall tendency to perform emotion-congruent
behavior and, with that, indicate that besides facilitating
emotion-congruent responses, motivational orientations
may interfere with task execution when the intended
behavior is not in line with the emotion that is experienced
(e.g., a forced approach).
Toward an integrated understanding of concepts,
mechanisms and processes
To summarize the above, it is clear that anxiety not only
affects perceptual-motor performance during movement
execution, but—in fact—also exerts its influence during the
perception and selection of action possibilities (cf. Pijpers
et al., 2006). Under anxiety, attention is drawn away from
task-relevant information, towards threat-related informa-
tion (i.e., attentional bias), and people are more likely to
perceive or interpret their environment as threatening (i.e.,
interpretational bias). As a result, possibilities for action
may not be recognized, or people may become biased
towards specific (threat-related) alternatives, leading to
changes in action selection (i.e., which movements are
performed). In addition, reductions in on-task attention and
increases in threat-related attention may also affect how
movements are performed. That is, movements may
become less accurate because too little time is spent fix-
ating a target, or they may deviate from their original path
because other (threat-related) locations are attended to as well.
Finally, besides attentional effects, anxiety may influence
movement execution as a result of changes in action readiness
(e.g., increased cortical excitability and muscle activity) and
an overall tendency to implement emotion-congruent (e.g.,
threat-related) behavioral responses.
Based on this overview, we will now return to the two
competing models of anxiety and perceptual-motor per-
formance: distraction models (e.g., Wilson, 2008) and
execution focus models (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001;
Masters, 1992)—shortly reiterate their distinctive hypoth-
eses, and discuss the extent to which they are (a) able to
account for the variety of effects that are observed in the
literature (scope); (b) naturally occurring in performance
settings; and (c) mutually exclusive or not.
Distraction versus execution focus
Based on cognitive theories of anxiety and performance,
most notably attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck
et al., 2007), distraction models suggest that anxious indi-
viduals may have too little attention available to calibrate
and adjust movements in relation to task-relevant informa-
tion (e.g., Wilson, 2008). As shown in the previous sections,
studies that tested this hypothesis have usually provided
supportive results and indicated that, as a result of anxiety,
task-relevant fixations are reduced at the cost of increases in
task-irrelevant (threat-related) fixations, thereby causing
a decrease in performance (e.g., Behan & Wilson, 2008;
Causer et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, et al., 2008;
Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans, 2011; Vickers and Williams,
2007; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009). Arguing against this view,
however, execution focus models maintain that rather than
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reducing on-task attention, anxiety causes attention to be
drawn inwards, leading to explicit attempts to monitor or
control ones movements (e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001;
Masters, 1992). For expert performers, this leads to a dis-
ruption of automatic processes and, hence, causes a decrease
in performance. Experimental studies that tested this
hypothesis have provided supportive results. That is, when
expert performers are asked to explicitly focus on their
movement execution, this consistently leads to a degrada-
tion of performance (e.g., Gray, 2004; Gucciardi and
Dimmock, 2008; Lam et al., 2009).
Scope
With respect to the variety of effects that anxiety may have
on perceptual-motor performance (e.g., attentional, inter-
pretational, or behavioral), and the different phases of
goal-directed action during which this may occur (i.e., per-
ception, selection, action), it should be noted that the scope of
both models is limited. Although distraction models may
also account for some of the effects of anxiety that are
observed during earlier phases of goal-directed action, both
distraction and execution focus models primarily concen-
trate on the final, executive, phase of the process: movement
execution. In addition, regarding the nature of effects, both
models are restricted to effects of anxiety on attention, and—
hence—do not account for what we have labeled ‘interpre-
tational’ effects (i.e., how the environment is perceived;
Proffitt, 2006; Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998)
and ‘behavioral’ effects (i.e., increases in action readiness
and behavioral response tendencies).
Natural occurrence
While each of the studies that supported distraction models
had their participants perform under natural (uncon-
strained) attentional instructions (e.g., Behan and Wilson,
2008; Causer et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, et al.,
2008; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011; Vickers and
Williams, 2007; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009), each of the
studies that supported execution focus models experimen-
tally manipulated their participants’ direction of attention
(either directly, e.g., Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008; Lam
et al., 2009; or indirectly, e.g., Gray, 2004). Consequently,
although it is clear that explicitly trying to monitor or
control movements can be devastating for experts’ per-
formance, a causal relation between anxiety and this spe-
cific type of attentional focus remains unsupported and, as
of yet, uninvestigated (Oudejans & Nieuwenhuys, 2009;
Oudejans, Kuijpers, Kooijman, & Bakker, 2011).
While it is certainly possible that—within performance
settings—people respond to anxiety by explicitly focusing
on their movement execution, it is questionable whether
this would typically occur. In fact, within the sports liter-
ature, many qualitative studies that examined elite athletes’
thoughts during competition showed that rather than
explicitly focusing on movement execution, all kinds of
distracting thoughts and worries occur naturally when
people perform under pressure (e.g., Gucciardi, Longbottom,
Jackson & Dimmock, 2010; Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle,
2000, 2001; Oudejans et al., 2011; Wilson & Smith, 2007).
For example, Oudejans and colleagues employed retro-
spective verbal reports to investigate elite athletes’ focus of
attention during high-pressure moments in sports. Among
more than 70 elite athletes from different sports and dis-
ciplines they found that, as a category, ‘‘explicit attention
to movement execution’’ represented only 4% of the data
that was reported. Instead, ‘‘worries’’ represented over 25%
of the data, suggesting that at least with respect to the
attentional focus of athletes, circumstances of pressure and
anxiety more often lead to distraction than explicit atten-
tion to movement execution (see Gucciardi et al., 2010, for
similar results).
Mutually exclusive?
Although execution focus does not seem to occur very
often, from a theoretical perspective, it is still important to
explore the extent to which its effect and occurrence may
be explained on the basis of distraction principles. Because
in performance settings movement execution may be
explicitly evaluated, it is not strange that specific circum-
stances (e.g., monitoring pressure or fear of failure;
DeCaro, Thomas, Albert, & Beilock, 2011) draw extra
attention to movements. For example, when a tennis player
performs an important match and (for some reason)
believes that her backhand is weak, her attention may be
drawn towards the execution of this stroke. However,
although this explains how execution focus may arise, if
one is to call this distraction, one has to acknowledge that
in some cases, movement execution is task-irrelevant rather
than task-relevant.
A key issue here is that what is considered to be task-
relevant is defined based on the experience of the per-
former in question. That is, while paying explicit attention
to movement execution is important and task-relevant in
the early phases of motor learning (e.g., Bernstein, 1996;
Whiting, 1984), this is no longer the case for experts. In
perceptual-motor tasks, expert skill execution is often
highly automatized, and requires a more ‘‘external’’, goal-
oriented focus in order to attain the best possible perfor-
mance (e.g., Beilock et al., 2002). Therefore, for expert
performers, explicit attention to movement execution
might be considered ‘‘task-irrelevant’’ (see Lam et al.,
2009, for a similar suggestion), it leaves too little attention
for task-relevant information (e.g., the target in an aiming
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action) and, hence, seriously harms the quality of
performance.
An integrated perspective
To summarize, although distraction and execution focus
models have proposed different mechanisms concerning
how anxiety may affect movement execution, they can
both be explained with the same (distraction) principles.
That is, under anxiety, attention is biased toward threat-
related stimuli, which typically leaves less attention to
adjust and calibrate movements on the basis of task-rele-
vant information (e.g., Wilson, 2008). In specific cases
(e.g., under monitoring pressure; DeCaro et al., 2011), this
may involve execution focus, which—for expert perform-
ers—is not task-relevant and may be particularly debilita-
tive to performance (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters,
1992).
Regarding their scope, distraction and execution focus
models are restricted to effects of anxiety on attention, and
mainly concentrate on how changes in attention affect
movement execution. Although movement execution cov-
ers an important part of goal-directed action, our review of
the literature showed that this constitutes a rather limited
approach. Within the complete process of perception,
selection and action (Pijpers et al., 2006), movement exe-
cution is the final phase, which makes it subsidiary or
subject to changes (i.e., effects of anxiety) in earlier phases.
That is, if anxiety already causes one to perceive and select
different (less optimal) action possibilities, it is of little
value whether the execution of action is subsequently
affected or not.
Finally, anxiety has been shown to not only affect
attention (e.g., which information is picked up), but also
influence our interpretation of information (e.g., how the
environment is perceived), and promote specific behavioral
responses (e.g., increases in action readiness and avoidance
tendencies). As such, there is a clear need to extend pre-
vious approaches and develop a model that involves the
interrelations between each of these mechanisms and pro-
cesses, thereby providing an integrated perspective on the
various ways through which anxiety may affect goal-
directed action.
An integrated model of anxiety and perceptual-motor
performance
The model that we propose is depicted in Fig. 1 and relies
heavily on some of the central tenets of existing models of
distraction, particularly attentional control theory (ACT,
Eysenck et al., 2007; for a review of ACT applied to
perceptual-motor contexts the reader is referred to Wilson,
2008). Similar to other distraction models, ACT posits that
anxiety affects performance negatively because top-down
(goal-directed) control is reduced at the cost of increases in
bottom-up (stimulus-driven) processing (see also Bishop,
2007). Based on our perceptual-motor perspective (i.e.,
perception, selection, action), however, we propose that
this imbalance not only affects attentional control—in a
sense that one becomes biased toward threat-related
information (Eysenck et al., 2007)—but also affects
interpretational processes (Bishop, 2007; Blanchette &
Richards, 2010) and facilitates emotion-specific behavioral
responses (Frijda, 1988; Zajonc, 1980; see also
Krieglmeyer et al., 2010, 2011; Lavender & Hommel,
2007; Schutter et al., 2008; Stins et al., 2011). In our model
these effects are represented by means of three operational
levels at which anxiety may exert its influence: threat-
related attention, threat-related interpretation, and threat-
related response tendencies (see Fig. 1). In turn, each
operational level is connected to more or less specific
phases of goal-directed action, which are depicted as a
perception–selection–action cycle.
A second assumption within ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007)
is that besides having negative effects on performance,
anxiety also serves a motivational function (see also
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Individuals may try to compen-
sate for the debilitative effects of anxiety through increases
in mental effort. In this way, anxiety will always affect the
‘‘efficiency’’ of performance (as more effort is needed to
obtain the same result) but the outcome (i.e., effectiveness)
of performance may remain unchanged or might even
improve. Based on the aforementioned distinction between
goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes (Eysenck
et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007), our model recognizes three
broad directions regarding how individuals may effectively
channel their mental effort (see Fig. 1). That is, people may
try to enforce goal-directed behavior, actively inhibit or
prevent stimulus-driven responses (i.e., attentional, inter-
pretational, or behavioral), or attempt to reduce their
feelings of anxiety.
Finally, in line with DeCaro et al. (2011), the specific
stressors that cause anxiety, the operational level at which
anxiety affects behavior (i.e., attentional, interpretational,
or behavioral), and the strategies that people use to com-
pensate for negative effects, are supposed to be dependent
on situational factors (e.g., task characteristics, environ-
mental constraints) and dispositional factors (e.g., trait
anxiety, state or action orientation; dispositional reinvest-
ment; see Fig. 1).
To further clarify our model we will shortly describe
each of these aspects, including: (1) how different opera-
tional effects of anxiety may specifically interfere with
goal-directed action; (2) how different strategies to channel
extra mental effort may exert different effects in terms of
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maintaining performance; and (3) how situational and
dispositional factors may determine the operational level at
which anxiety interferes with performance and the strate-
gies that are employed to compensate for negative effects.
Negative effects of anxiety on perceptual-motor
performance
Threat-related attention
First of all, anxiety increases the amount of attention that is
paid to threat-related sources of information (i.e., atten-
tional bias; Eysenck et al., 2007) and leaves less attention
to perceive, select, and realize possibilities for action (see
Fig. 1). For instance, in climbing on a climbing wall,
anxiety has been shown to cause people to execute more
(and shorter) explorative fixations to a larger number of
handholds, thereby leading to changes in option selection
(moving over shorter distances), and slower, more rigid,
movements (Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, et al., 2008; see also
Pijpers et al., 2006). In addition, in other contexts (e.g.,
taking a penalty kick in soccer) it has been shown that
threat-related stimuli (e.g., the goalkeeper) can serve as
attractors, and cause movements to deviate in their direc-
tion (e.g., Wilson, Wood et al., 2009; Binsch et al., 2010).
Finally, when attended stimuli directly concern movement
execution (i.e., execution focus) anxiety may lead to a
breakdown of automatic control processes and, as such,
seriously harm performance (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001;
Masters, 1992).
Threat-related interpretation
Anxiety also leads to threat-related interpretation (Bishop,
2007; Blanchette & Richards, 2010), meaning that although
one is visually attending to task-relevant information, this
information may be perceived differently (e.g., Proffitt,
2006), or may be misinterpreted (e.g., Nieuwenhuys,
Savelsbergh, et al., 2011) based on one’s current feeling or
state. For instance, individuals who are afraid of heights,
tend to see heights as being higher than individuals who are
not afraid of heights (e.g., Teachman et al., 2008), and
police officers who are afraid to get shot are more prone to
recognize a suspect’s weapon, even when there is none
(e.g., Correll et al., 2002; Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh, et al.,
2011; Payne, 2001). Although such effects may clearly lead
to suboptimal response selection (e.g., shooting an innocent
suspect) it may also mean that possibilities for action are
not perceived, or that movements are not properly cali-
brated in relation to a target. For instance, Nieuwenhuys,
Savelsbergh, et al., (2011) showed that when they were
afraid of being hit, threat-related expectations prevented
police officers from using visual information, caused them
to take less time for their decisions, and made them shoot
less accurately.
Threat-related response tendencies
Finally, on a behavioral level, anxiety may lead to changes
in action readiness and create a tendency to perform






























Fig. 1 An integrated model of anxiety and perceptual-motor performance
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blood pressure, breath frequency, muscle activity and
energy expenditure all increase under anxiety, causing
movements to become less efficient (e.g., Nibbeling et al.,
2011; Pijpers et al., 2006). In addition, as shown nicely by
Stins et al. (2011), increases in action readiness, together
with motivational response tendencies (i.e., avoidance),
make it harder to initiate (emotion-incongruent) approach
movements in relation to a threatening stimulus (see also
Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010), and
cause people to make more executive mistakes when the
intended (goal-directed) behavior is not in line with the
emotion that is experienced (cf. Krieglmeyer et al., 2011).
How extra mental effort may help to maintain
performance under anxiety
Besides affecting performance negatively, anxiety also
serves a motivational function that enables people to try
and maintain performance through increases in mental
effort (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007).
Enforce goal-directed processing
First of all, individuals may try to re-enforce or maintain
task-relevant processes (see Fig. 1). Although in principle
this can be done at each operational level (attentional,
interpretational, behavioral), the maintenance of goal-
directed attention seems most apparent. For instance, a
surgeon who is executing a life-saving operation may force
him or herself to focus on properly executing an incision,
instead of thinking about the terrible consequences of
making a mistake. While this may be hard to achieve
without any experience, recent experimental work by
Wilson, Vine, Masters, and McGrath (2011) showed that
deliberate visual attention training, in which medical
trainees watched video’s that showed the gaze pattern of
experienced surgeons, can be effective in protecting tech-
nical laparoscopic skills under distracting multi-tasking
conditions. Alternatively, Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans
(2011) showed that merely getting used to the pressure and
anxiety that accompanies performance, may exert a similar
positive effect on visual attentional processes (see also
Oudejans, 2008; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2009, 2010).
Inhibit stimulus-driven processing
Negative effects of anxiety may also be compensated by
inhibiting stimulus-driven processes (see Fig. 1). For
instance, individuals may try to deliberately stop thinking
about or attending to threat-related sources of information.
However, although such attempts can be very successful, a
potential caveat is that trying hard not to attend (or
respond) to something may ironically draw more attention
towards it (or make the unwanted response more likely;
Wegner, 1994). For example, deliberate attempts to not
shoot close to the keeper in taking a penalty kick in soccer
have been shown to lead to longer fixations on the keeper
(a potential source of threat) and, consequently, caused
participants to shoot closer to the keeper (Binsch et al.,
2010). Alternatively, individuals may also try to distract
themselves from the threat they experience. For instance,
recent work by DeCaro et al. (2011) showed that when
little attention is required to perform a certain task, dis-
traction strategies may help to prevent pressure-induced
increases in execution focus.
Reduce anxiety
Finally, individuals may try to reduce or prevent the
experience of anxiety itself (see Fig. 1). For instance, a
talented musician, who is anxious before an important
concert, may use breathing techniques or imagery to calm
down before she gets on stage (e.g., Gould & Udry, 1994).
By using such strategies, the experience of anxiety may be
reduced, thereby reducing stimulus-driven processing and
facilitating performance.
Situational and dispositional factors
The operational level(s) at which anxiety will eventually
affect goal-directed action, as well as the strategies that
people may employ to try and maintain performance, are
not supposed to be fixed, but highly dependent on situa-
tional factors (e.g., task characteristics) and dispositional
factors (e.g., individual differences; see Fig. 1). For
example, as shown by DeCaro et al. (2011), the degree of
attentional control that is required to perform a certain task
and the specific type of pressure that people are imposed
with, strongly determine if and how (e.g., through dis-
traction or execution focus) performance is affected or not.
In addition, people are most likely to be affected by those
aspects of a pressure situation that are most salient to them
and will react to situations in a manner that fits with their
previous experiences and actions (i.e., dispositional fac-
tors). For example, individuals who tend to be action ori-
ented are more likely to reinforce goal-directed attention,
whereas individuals that are state oriented are more likely
to concentrate on their feelings of anxiety (e.g., Jostmann
& Koole, 2007). Similarly, individuals who score high on
dispositional reinvestment are more likely to consciously
control their movements than individuals who score low on
dispositional reinvestment (e.g., Masters, Polman, &
Hammond, 1993; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006).
Although to date, several studies have rendered important
findings regarding specific factors that influence the rela-
tion between anxiety and (perceptual-motor) performance,
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more work is needed to compare across different factors
and to extend these findings to each operational level at
which anxiety may exert its influence (i.e., attentional,
interpretational, behavioral).
Discussion and directions for future research
In the current paper we aimed to shed more light on the
concepts, mechanisms, and processes that underlie the
relation between anxiety and perceptual-motor perfor-
mance. Based on a structured review of the available lit-
erature, we discussed the scope of two competing
hypotheses (i.e., distraction vs. execution focus), and pro-
posed an integrated model that describes the various con-
cepts, mechanisms, and processes that are involved. This
model is strongly based on distraction principles (i.e.,
attentional control theory; Eysenck et al., 2007) but extends
previous approaches by recognizing separate operational
levels (i.e., attentional, interpretational, and behavioral) at
which anxiety may affect different aspects of goal-directed
action (i.e., perception, selection, and action).
Although the conceptualization of goal-directed action
as a process of perceiving, selecting, and realizing possi-
bilities for action is not new (Pijpers et al., 2006), effects of
anxiety on perceptual-motor performance are rarely studied
from this perspective. That is, most studies have paid little
attention to anxiety-induced effects on perceiving and
selecting possibilities for action and concentrated exclu-
sively on movement execution (cf. Beilock & Gray, 2007).
Although in experimental settings, it is easy to isolate
movement execution (e.g., through task instructions), in
real-life situations, movements are often initiated in a
context, on the basis of action possibilities that are per-
ceived in and selected from the environment. Conse-
quently, effects of anxiety on how movements are executed
will often be subsidiary to effects of anxiety on processes
that determine which movements are executed. Based on
this argument, we believe that including the perception and
selection of action possibilities in our model constitutes an
important advancement with respect to earlier approaches
(e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992; Wilson, 2008).
Furthermore, besides recognizing that perceptual-motor
behavior constitutes a process of perceiving, selecting, and
realizing possibilities for action, our model distinguishes three
operational levels at which anxiety may exert its influence:
attentional, interpretational, and behavioral. Although a dis-
tinction between these operational levels seems justified based
on the literature, more work is needed to properly understand
their respective impacts on performance.
By proposing separate levels at which anxiety may exert
its influence, our model inherently asks the question to
what degree each operational level is responsible for an
eventual breakdown in performance. Although it is likely
that individual differences are of influence, we hypothesize
that in this respect task characteristics may prove to be a
major determinant (see also DeCaro et al., 2011). That is,
precision tasks that require a great deal of online (visual)
control will be strongly affected at the attentional level,
tasks that involve a great deal of uncertainty will be
strongly affected at the interpretational level, and tasks that
are mainly executive will be strongly affected at the
behavioral level.
In a similar vein, we would like to propose that the ways
in which individuals can compensate for negative effects of
anxiety (through increases in mental effort), are restricted
by the behavioral possibilities of the environment and the
time that is available to respond to (or deal with) a specific
stressor. That is, if there is much time (e.g., during the
perception and selection of action possibilities), individuals
may still try to reduce their feelings of anxiety or inhibit
stimulus-driven processing, whereas if there is little or no
time (e.g., during movement execution) they may simply
attempt to enforce goal-directed behavior. In addition, it is
likely that the effectiveness of specific strategies is
dependent on the operational level at which anxiety exerts
its effect. For example, employing a specific gaze strategy
may help to prevent attentional effects of anxiety (i.e., what
information we attend to), but may be less useful to counter
effects on an interpretational level (i.e., how we perceive or
interpret our environment).
At present, little is known about the effectiveness of
different strategies that individuals may use (Nicholls &
Polman, 2007). Nevertheless, learning about the specific
threats that people are confronted with in a given context,
and the operational level(s) at which these threats interfere
with performance, may prove to be a fruitful endeavor
(e.g., Nieuwenhuys, Hanin, & Bakker, 2008; Nieuwenhuys,
Vos, Pijpstra, & Bakker, 2011). In our view, the current
model offers a useful framework along the lines of which
this may be done.
In conclusion, we believe that our integrated model
provides a relatively complete and comprehensive under-
standing of the relation between anxiety and perceptual-
motor performance. By conceptualizing perceptual-motor
behavior as a process of perception, selection, and action
rather than movement execution per se, and by distin-
guishing between attentional, interpretational, and behav-
ioral effects of anxiety rather than focusing on attentional
effects alone, the model extends previous approaches and
closely matches the wide range of findings that is observed
in the literature. It is important to note that by extending
previous approaches our model does not necessarily
invalidate existing hypotheses (e.g., distraction, execution
focus). Rather, it places different approaches into a unified
perspective, thereby showing the interrelations between
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various concepts, mechanisms and processes. Based on this
integrated approach, the model allows testing the relative
contributions of separate mechanisms, and provides spe-
cific predictions regarding the factors that determine how
anxiety may affect performance. Finally, by also recog-
nizing positive (motivational) effects of anxiety our model
features important practical implications. As such, it may
provide starting points for alleviating the negative effects
of anxiety on perceptual-motor performance, and provide
performers with the tools they need to secure their per-
formance under anxiety.
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